Willie Betts v. Summit Oaks Hospital by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-27-2017 
Willie Betts v. Summit Oaks Hospital 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Willie Betts v. Summit Oaks Hospital" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 404. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/404 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-187       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1320 
____________ 
 
WILLIE KAY BETTS, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUMMIT OAKS HOSPITAL 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-06357) 
District Judge: Susan D. Wigenton 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 6, 2017 
Before:   CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 27, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Willie Kay Betts appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to Summit Oaks Hospital.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm. 
                                              
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Betts, a Registered Nurse, was hired full-time by the Hospital, a substance abuse 
and mental health treatment center, in November, 2011.  Betts was primarily assigned to 
the Hospital’s Rehabilitation Unit, “TU2.”  Although TU2 was considered her home unit, 
she was at times also assigned to work the Detoxification Unit, “TU3.”  In 2012, Betts 
was assigned or “floated” to other units including TU3 to cover a particular daily shift.  
On May 24, 2013, she filed a charge of discrimination with the New Jersey Division of 
Civil Rights, and, on August 13, 2013, she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging racial discrimination in 
connection with her assignments to cover the Detoxification Unit.  The EEOC did not file 
a complaint against the Hospital. 
 On October 14, 2014, Betts filed suit pro se in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, alleging that the Hospital had discriminated against her on the 
basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, 
et seq.  Betts alleged that she was assigned to TU3 for the greater part of 2012; and that 
she floated to TU3 more often than other nurses until she finally retired from the hospital 
on August 1, 2015.  Specifically, Betts alleged that she was floated twice as often as 
Mikola Mikolav, the only other full-time day-shift nurse assigned to TU2.  She also 
alleged that she was floated to TU3 more often than the Hospital’s per-diem and part-
time nurses, all because of her race. 
 Betts was deposed, and, following the close of discovery, the Hospital moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that Betts had not alleged any conduct which could be 
deemed an adverse action.  The Hospital also argued and showed through evidence that 
temporary staffing, or “floating,” is consistent with its written policy for the management 
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of nursing personnel, that policy being that daily staffing must be adjusted according to 
census, patient acuity, and the availability of staff.  Betts responded in opposition to the 
Hospital’s motion for summary judgment.  In an order entered on January 10, 2017, the 
District Court granted summary judgment to the Hospital. 
Betts appeals.  Our Clerk granted her leave to appeal in forma pauperis and 
advised her that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the summary judgment record 
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving 
party then must present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A 
court should grant summary judgment where the non-movant’s evidence is merely 
colorable or not significantly probative, id. at 249-50, because “[w]here the record taken 
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is 
no genuine issue for trial,”  Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks removed). 
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To prevail on a Title VII claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a 
prima facie case.  A prima facie case of discrimination based on race requires that a 
plaintiff show the following: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for 
the position; (3) she suffered some form of adverse employment action; and (4) the 
adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.  St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 
(1993); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  The District Court noted 
the appropriate legal standards, reviewed the summary judgment record, and concluded 
that, although Betts was floated to TU3, perhaps even on a regular basis, this did not 
affect her title, pay, or benefits.  The District Court thus agreed with the Hospital that 
Betts had not suffered an adverse employment action. 
We conclude that summary judgment for the Hospital was proper.  The District 
Court did not err in its determination that there was no genuine issue of fact with respect 
to whether Betts suffered an adverse employment action.  An actionable adverse 
employment action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.”  Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 761 (1998).  Although Betts was required to work in TU3 when her preferred unit 
was her home unit (TU2), the floating that took place was insufficient to constitute an 
adverse employment action, even if we assume for purposes of summary judgment that 
nurses assigned to TU3 “do the work of five people,” as Betts testified in her deposition.  
Betts simply failed to rebut the Hospital’s evidence that being floated to TU3 had a 
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tangible impact on her employment, particularly in view of the Hospital’s policy 
regarding staffing.  Her title, pay, benefits, and terms of employment remained the same 
throughout her employment at the Hospital.  She thus failed to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, and, accordingly, the Hospital was entitled to summary 
judgment.1 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to Summit Oaks Hospital.  
                                              
1 Because the summary judgment record does not show a triable issue with respect to the 
existence of an adverse employment action, it was not necessary for the District Court to 
reach the other requirements for a prima facie case, including the requirement that the 
adverse employment action occur under circumstances that give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination. 
